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Excuses and exempting conditions aim to mitigate respon-
sibility. This paper proposes a distinction between excuses and 
exemptions in terms of the distinctive kind of judgement each of 
them aims to respond. I argue that exemptions affect the explan-
atory relevance of the accused, while excuses fully or partially 
justify her, by affecting the evaluative claim involved in respon-
sibility attributions. This distinction supports the claim that at-
tributing responsibility is a two-step process, each of them cor-
responding to a different kind of responsibility—agential and 
moral—whose attribution is guided by two different although 
related cognitive and argumentative tasks: explaining an out-
come, and evaluating its moral significance.
Keywords: moral responsibility, explanatory judgements, ex-
cuses, exempting conditions.
Resumen
Las excusas y las condiciones eximentes tienen como 
finalidad mitigar la responsabilidad. Este artículo propone una 
distinción entre excusas y eximentes basada en el tipo distintivo 
de juicio que cada una trata de responder. Argumento que los 
eximentes afectan la relevancia causal del acusado, mientras que 
las excusas lo justifican total o parcialmente, porque afectan al 
juicio evaluativo implícito en las atribuciones de responsabilidad. 
Esta distinción apoya una concepción de las atribuciones de 
responsabilidad  como  un  proceso  en  dos  etapas,  donde  cada 
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una de ellas corresponde a un tipo diferente de responsabilidad 
(agencial y moral), cuya atribución está guiada por dos tareas 
cognitivas y argumentativas diferentes, aunque relacionadas: 
explicar lo que produjo una situación, y evaluar su significación 
moral.
Palabras clave: responsabilidad moral, juicios explicativos, 
excusas, condiciones eximentes.
0. Introduction
The concept of responsibility plays an important role both in Ethics 
and in the Philosophy of Action,1 often with very different meanings. 
Despite its pervasiveness, the attempts to bring together the agential and 
moral aspects of responsibility —or to find out whether it is possible, or 
fruitful, to do so —are scarce. During the last decade, though, the relation 
between moral and intentional judgements has received increasing 
attention, specially within the fields of Experimental Philosophy and 
Metaethics. The aim of this paper is to approach the problem of the 
relation between agency and responsibility through an analysis of the 
conditions that mitigate responsibility, that is, excuses and exempting 
conditions, such as duress, insanity, overlapping of moral duties and 
provocation, amongst others.
The  idea  that different mitigating conditions achieve the same 
end —to relieve the agent from her responsibility— through different 
means is not new. Austin proposed the following distinction between 
justifications and excuses: “In the one defence, briefly, we accept 
responsibility but deny that it was bad: in the other, we admit that it 
was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility”(Austin, 1956, 
2). By justifying our actions, we attack the claim that what we did was 
wrong. By excusing our behaviour, we explicit some conditions that 
mitigate our responsibility. Some excuses, such as insanity, exempt the 
agent from any responsibility. Exemptions would work as relievers 
of the agents’ duties: “[e]xcusing someone in this sense amounts to 
exempting him from what would otherwise be a requirement, or at least 
an expectation” (Baron, 2007, 32).
1 The concept of responsibility is also central in legal and epistemic 
contexts; however, for the sake of simplicity, I will leave legal and epistemic 
responsibility aside.
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From a different tradition, Strawson (2008, chap. 1) claimed that 
there are two different kinds of pleas that aim to modify the feeling of 
resentment that is the basis for holding someone responsible. The first 
kind, which would correspond to excusing conditions (Watson, 1987), are 
meant to point out to certain conditions that make the agent’s actions an 
inappropriate target of reactive attitudes. The second kind of pleas aims 
to show that the agent herself is not an appropriate target of such attitudes. 
Within this category, Strawson makes a distinction between ‘transitory’ 
(such as acting under post-hypnotic suggestion) and ‘enduring’ (such 
as being a child, or being deranged) exempting conditions (Campbell, 
2005). Wallace (1994) adopts and develops Strawson’s categorisation, 
and argues that exemptions, unlike excuses, affect the agent’s powers of 
reflective self-control.
My aim in this paper is twofold. On the one hand, I want to suggest 
that mitigating conditions may be divided in excuses and exempting 
conditions by attending to the distinctive kind of judgement each of 
them aims to affect. Attributing moral responsibility consists both in 
making an explanatory claim about the outcome, which can be affected 
by exempting conditions, and in making an evaluative claim about the 
moral status of the agent or her actions, which can be affected by excuses. 
On the other hand, I will argue that this distinction can shed some light 
on the debate about responsibility attributions: the two-staged model of 
responsibility it supports explains some of our intuitions about the kind 
of judgements involved in attributing responsibility.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The first section analyses 
the causal link between the agent and the outcome that, intuitively, 
must hold in order to attribute responsibility to the agent for that 
outcome. Agential responsibility, I will suggest, is attributed when the 
outcome is explained in terms of the agent’s authorship. Exempting 
conditions diminish or nullify agential responsibility because they affect 
the explanatory relevance of the accused. On the other hand, excuses, 
as it will be argued in the second section, aim to block the transition 
from agential to moral responsibility. In the third section, I argue that the 
distinction proposed presents an argumentative view of responsibility 
attributions, and it supports a two-staged account of responsibility. 
In the last section, I will discuss the distinction between normative 
and empirical models of responsibility, and I will present some of the 
experimental results within the recent field of experimental philosophy.
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1. Exemptions and agential responsibility
It is a strong and widespread intuition that, in order to make agent A 
responsible for outcome O, there needs to be a causal relation between A 
and O (Sartorio, 2007; Moore, 2009). When we hold someone responsible 
for a plant’s death, we also express a causal judgements: that the plant 
died because of that agent’s actions or omissions. That is, we relate the 
agent to the outcome in a causal explanation.
Causal efficacy, however, is too broad to constitute the sole basis for 
holding someone responsible, for there are many things that we cause, 
and we are not responsible for all of them. Furthermore, omissions 
(Sartorio, 2004), causally overdetermined outcomes (Funkhouser, 
2002), and negligible contributions to a collectively produced outcome 
(Mellema, 1985) challenge the view that causal efficacy is required for 
moral responsibility.
A solution to the problem of the relation between causation and 
responsibility is to consider that the appropriate relation between an 
agent and an outcome is not necessarily that of causal efficacy, but of 
explanatory relevance (Beebee, 2004; Björnsson and Persson, 2012). What 
is important is the role played by an agent in the causal explanation 
of the outcome for which responsibility is being attributed. A causal 
explanation consists, in general, in answering a question about why 
something is the case. A correct explanation does not require to mention 
all the causal relations and factors into play; some of these factors are 
selected and highlighted, depending on their relevance for the context 
of the explanation. Relevance is given by the context against which 
the explanation is required (Menzies, 2004). Background assumptions 
discriminate the important or relevant causes from other candidates, 
through contrasting its role in the production in the outcome, and 
through evaluating alternative outcomes. Background assumptions 
include both the inquirer’s and the explainer’s beliefs, presuppositions, 
and expectations. They function as a ceteris paribus clause, stressing the 
relevance of certain factors when all the other background conditions 
remain constant (Schweder, 1999). The practice of asking for and offering 
explanations is contextual to the background assumptions against which 
the explanation is required. Thus, an event has only causal relevance 
compared to other events; as Hitchcock claims, “relations of positive 
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or negative causal relevance only hold relative to specific alternatives” 
(Hitchcock, 1996, 402). The alternatives against which the causal 
relevance of the agent is assessed include those made up by normative 
expectations, such as a standard of reasonable person (Bok, 1998). This is 
why it is possible to be responsible for an outcome even in cases in which 
the outcome was not intended nor foreseen by the agent. When an agent 
acts negligently, she has not acted as a “reasonable person”, this is, with 
reasonable care (Keating, 1996); this violation of the normative standard 
of a reasonable person makes her actions relevant in the explanation of 
the outcome. In other words, our beliefs about what an agent should 
have done (because it is reasonable to do so) are part of the basis for 
evaluating what role that agent has played in the production of the 
outcome.
Thus, when we hold an agent responsible, we take the agent to be 
part of the explanation of why the outcome is the case. This is why the 
concept of ‘agential responsibility’ gathers in a more suitable way the 
explanatory relation between an agent and an outcome, instead of that 
of ‘causal responsibility’. Agential responsibility broadly corresponds to 
authorship: to attribute authorship of an action or state of affairs consists 
in explaining that action or state of affairs appealing to the author’s 
reasons, those for which the agent acts, and that the agent acknowledges 
as her reasons (Frankfurt, 1987; Moran, 2001).
Agential responsibility, although based on normative considerations, 
is a non-moral kind of responsibility, that is, it is conceptually 
independent2 from the moral evaluation of the outcome. It merely 
reflects that the agent is the author (or co-author) of the outcome. For 
example, I know that riding on a rollercoaster makes me feel queasy; 
and despite of that fact, I like doing so. Last weekend, I went to an 
amusement park and decided to go on the rollercoaster, and as a result 
I felt (unsurprisingly) dizzy for a while. I am agent-responsible for my 
dizziness, insofar it can be explained through my choices and actions. 
2 However, causal judgements may affect moral judgements, and vice 
versa, as experimental philosophers suggest. Insofar as explanatory relevance 
depends on normative considerations about how the agent should have 
acted, there is room for moral considerations to play a role in that normative 
background against which the explanation is required or offered. I will discuss 
some experimental results in Section 4.
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But no moral consideration is here at stake: my action was morally 
neutral.
Certain mitigating conditions attempt to reconsider the explanatory 
link between the agent and the outcome. I shall call those conditions 
exempting. They mitigate, or even undermine, agential responsibility, and 
they do so by making it inappropriate to explain the outcome in terms 
of the agent’s authorship. They modify the background assumptions 
against which the explanation is required and offered, in a way that the 
relevance of the agent is diminished or nullified. Exempting conditions 
often provide an alternative explanation of the outcome. They are not an 
all-or-nothing matter: they can just put forward that a previously ignored 
(or understated) factor plays an explanatory role in the production of 
the outcome, hence diminishing the relevance of the agent.
There would be two main kinds of exempting conditions: those 
that interfere with the accused agential capabilities (either internal or 
external), and those that point out that certain external conditions are 
relevant in the explanation of the outcome, either nullifying the agent’s 
role, or diminishing its importance.
The first kind of exempting conditions has been largely analysed in 
the philosophical literature on moral responsibility, because they refer 
to the conditions an agent must fulfil in order to be held responsible, 
such as freedom conditions, selfcontrol, reason-responsiveness, 
amongst others (see, for example, Pettit, 2007; Braham and Hees, 
2012). The lack of one or more of these conditions can be presented as 
exempting from responsibility. While it may be correct to assert that this 
is so because these conditions are necessary for (moral, rational) agency 
to be exercised, my aim is to show that they exempt the agent because 
they play a relevant role in the explanation of the outcome, to the point 
of diminishing or nullifying the explanatory role of authorship. For 
example, a person under hypnosis will act as commanded no matter 
what reasons she might have for or against acting in such way; thus, she 
is not exercising her agency, or put otherwise, her agential capabilities are 
not explanatory. She is thus partially or totally exempt of responsibility. 
The difference between partial and total exemptions is a matter of the 
explanatory role of the agent, given the exempting conditions that hold: 
it may be the case that she does not play any explanatory role, or that 
her role is diminished. For instance, the degree up to which alcohol 
(or other drugs) make the agent exempt will depend on the amount of 
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alcohol consumed, and on the causal effects of the alcohol on the agent’s 
capabilities.
Not all the exemptions require that the agent lacks one or more of 
the conditions to be held responsible. A second kind of exemptions are 
those cases in which the agent meets the criteria above, and nonetheless 
it is not appropriate to explain the outcome in terms of authorship alone. 
Greene and Cohen (2004) illustrate this possibility through the following 
example:
Let us suppose, then, that a group of scientists has 
managed to create an individual —call him ‘Mr 
Puppet’— who, by design, engages in some kind of 
criminal behaviour: say, a murder during a drug deal 
gone bad. The defence calls to the stand the project’s 
lead scientist: ‘Please tell us about your relationship to 
Mr Puppet...’
“It is very simple, really. I designed him. I carefully 
selected every gene in his body and carefully scripted 
every significant event in his life so that he would 
become precisely what he is today. I selected his mother 
knowing that she would let him cry for hours and hours 
before picking him up. [...] At any rate, my plans for 
him succeeded, as they have for 95% of the people I’ve 
designed. I assure you that the accused deserves none 
of the credit.”
What to do with Mr Puppet? Insofar as we believe this 
testimony, we are inclined to think that Mr Puppet 
cannot be held fully responsible for his crimes, if he 
can be held responsible for them at all […] [G]iven the 
fact that forces beyond his control played a dominant 
role in causing him to commit these crimes, it is hard 
to think of him as anything more than a pawn (Greene 
and Cohen, 2004, 1780).
Mr Puppet does not lack any control or reason-responsiveness 
conditions. He is not either under the direct control of the group of 
scientists; instead, they have set up all the variables (with an error 
margin of 5%) for shaping his identity. The actual outcome is that Mr 
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Puppet has committed murder in a drug deal gone bad. However, 
knowing the prior conditions makes a difference in the explanation of 
the murder. Was the murder planned, it would be more easily explained 
by appealing to scientists’ plan, rather than Mr Puppet’s motives to 
commit the murder, because the explanation of his motives would point 
to the scientists’ plan as well. On the other hand, if Mr Puppet acted 
unexpectedly, thus changing the planned course of action, intuitively, 
he could be held responsible for the murder.
Note that Mr Puppet’s case does not necessarily entail a deterministic 
conception of agency. It could be well the case that Mr Puppet’s actions 
could not be predicted with a 100% accuracy because of his freedom to 
choose. What this example points out is that the more we know about 
the causal chain leading to an agent’s choices and actions, the more 
complete their explanation will be. Adding more additional factors to a 
causal explanation usually diminishes the relevance of each factor.
Hence, both the agent’s capabilities and the explanatory relevance 
of other causal factors may be presented as exempting conditions. In 
both cases, those conditions aim to modify the background assumptions 
against which the explanation of the outcome for which responsibility 
is attributed. Those assumptions are conformed by the empirical and 
normative expectations concerning how the world and the agent will, 
and should, act.
There are two cases, though, that challenge this view. The first of 
them is drunkenness: a drunken person usually does not display a high 
level of self-control. Although she does not meet the conditions for being 
held responsible, it is usually considered that she is instead responsible 
for getting drunk in the first place: in the words of Sir Francis Bacon, “if 
a mad man commit a felonie he shall not lose his life for it, because his 
infirmity came by the Act of God; but if a drunken man commit a felonie, 
he shall not be excused because his imperfection came by his owne 
default”(Bacon, 1630, 34). The second problematic case is forgetting: 
it is non-exempting, but apparently inevitable. Suppose that Ann has 
promised to water Bob’s plants; unfortunately, she forgets about her 
promise, and as a result, Bob’s plants die. Ann’s forgetting can be hardly 
seen as voluntary: having made that promise simply did not come to 
her mind.
Those two cases (drunkenness and forgetness) indicate that, in 
our cultural context, the usual background assumptions include a 
normative standard of conduct regarding the use of alcohol (or other 
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drugs) and a normative expectation not to forget one’s duties. The 
normative expectations concerning the use of alcohol include the belief 
that people should foresee what they are capable to do while drunk, and 
avoid drinking if they believe they will lose control. On the other hand, 
concerning forgetfulness, we expect from people to remember their 
duties: if one makes a promise, not only one should fulfil it, but also 
take the necessary steps not to forget it. However, in both cases, it seems 
more appropriate to claim that, even if drunkenness and forgetfulness 
partially or totally make the agent exempt, she is nonetheless responsible 
for getting drunk in the first place, and for failing to remember her duties.
Therefore, both the agential conditions to be held responsible, as 
well as the standards for tracing the agent’s actions and values, belong 
to the set of background assumptions against which the explanation of 
any outcome is required and offered. Furthermore, these assumptions 
include normative expectations about what should or should not be the 
case. Whether a circumstance is considered as exempting or not will 
depend precisely on the context of the explanation.
2. Excuses and moral responsibility
While exempting conditions aim to influence the explanatory 
judgement about the outcome, excuses are offered to affect the 
evaluative judgement about the agent who is held responsible. If the 
kind of responsibility at stake is moral, the evaluative judgement will 
be moral: it is asserted that what the agent did was morally wrong (or 
right). While agential responsibility entails an assessment of the agent 
and the outcome in the light of some normative standard, as that of a 
“reasonable person”, moral responsibility entails an assessment of the 
agent in the light of moral standards. Moral expectations are the basis 
for attributing moral responsibility. Excuses aim to put forward certain 
conditions that may modify the moral expectations over the agent.
Thus, agential responsibility conceptually precedes moral 
responsibility. If an agent is not agent-responsible for an outcome, she 
cannot be held morally responsible for that outcome. In other words: if 
the agent is exempt, there is no basis for evaluating the moral status of 
the agent with regard to that particular outcome. In fact, excuses aim to 
block the transition from agential to moral responsibility, or, in Duff’s 
terms, from responsibility to moral criticism or blame (Duff, 2007). That 
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is, the agent admits her authorship, but presents an argument against 
the claim that she acted wrongly:
To excuse my action is to admit I had conclusive 
reason not to act as I did —that I acted either against a 
categorical, indefeasible reason, or against the balance 
of reasons; but to plead that I could not reasonably 
have been expected to act in accordance with either that 
categorical reason or the balance of reasons— which 
is to say, since the expectation that is involved here is 
clearly a normative one, that I cannot reasonably be 
condemned for failing to act thus. To offer an excuse is 
thus to admit responsibility, but deny liability: I admit 
to committing an action for which I must now answer, 
but seek to block the otherwise legitimate transition 
from responsibility to liability (liability, in this context, 
to moral criticism or blame) by offering an exculpatory 
answer (Duff, 2007, 53).
It might be possible, in principle, to excuse someone for a 
praiseworthy outcome. I will turn to the relation between exemptions, 
excuses and praise in the last section; for now, I will assume that excuses 
are put forward to affect negative moral judgements.
Excuses have justificatory force, either partial or total. An agent is 
fully justified when her actions cannot be considered wrong, and she 
is partially justified when her actions respond to some moral standards 
(although she has violated other standards). Full justification is 
exculpatory; partial justification is mitigating (Franklin, 2013).
The difference between full and partial justifications is that the 
former, but not the latter, denies moral responsibility: it is possible to 
explain the outcome in terms of the agent, but what she did does not 
constitute a violation of a moral standard. Full justification requires 
some sort of entitlement to act, so the action is not wrong for that agent 
(Botterell, 2009). For example, suppose that a doctor is administering a 
patient morphine to relief her from her suffering, and knows that her 
patient has a high probability to die as a consequence of the drug. When 
attributed responsibility for the death of the patient, she can argue 
that she had the permission (due to her medical authority and to the 
patient’s will) to do it, and that it is not wrong to administer morphine 
to terminal patients. Thus, the doctor is justified in administering 
241Excuses and exemptions
Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 49 (2015)
morphine. She is agent-responsible for the patient’s death; however, the 
doctor did not acted wrongly, for it was morally permissible for her to 
do it.3 Justifications usually argue against the moral expectations that 
the attributer of responsibility has. In the example above, justifying 
to administer morphine to a terminal patient implies to claim that it 
is normatively expected from the doctor to do so —perhaps through 
arguing the normative reasons to guarantee a terminal patient a painless 
death.
Overlapping moral duties usually fully justify the agent, if those 
duties entitle the agent to act as she did. Suppose that Ann promised 
Bob to water his plants while he is on holiday. Bob goes on vacation 
and, two days later, Ann’s mother falls severely sick, and her life is at 
risk. Whilst Ann’s promise does not cease to be in force, she is morally 
entitled to unfulfil it to care for her mother.
An excuse, on the other hand, may offer a partial justification: the 
accused is, in this case, agent-responsible for that outcome, and that 
outcome or the actions leading to the outcome are morally wrong; 
however, there are (some) moral standards that the agent has respected. 
In this sense, partial excuses acknowledge that the agent has violated 
some moral expectations, but attempt to provide reasons that make the 
conduct reasonable. Following our example above, suppose that Ann has 
promised Bob to water his plants. When Bob comes back from vacation, 
his plants have dried —Ann did not fulfil her promise. She may try to 
excuse her behaviour by explaining why she did not water the plants. 
For instance, she might allege that she had a very busy week and that 
she left work late, so going to Bob’s house became an effortful task. She 
might have tried to delegate her duty to someone else, without success. 
Hence, while it is true that she broke a promise, she had reasons to do 
it. Whether those reasons are good reasons will depend on the judging 
agent: while, to some, Ann would not be excused at all, to others she is 
partially justified, or even fully justified. Practical justification depends, 
as in the case of agential responsibility, on the empirical and normative 
standards against which the moral evaluation is made.
Responsibility attributions, then, entail both an explanatory and an 
evaluative judgement. Even if both judgements are often made against 
the same background assumptions, they should remain independent, 
3 I am aware that this example is controversial. I assume here that the 
medical procedure described in the example is morally correct.
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for they have different aims: while explanatory judgements aim to figure 
out why something happened, moral evaluative judgements aim to 
assess the moral significance of the agent’s role in the production of the 
outcome. Although background assumptions are socially constructed 
(such as the standard of the ‘reasonable person’) and shared amongst 
the members of a community, judgements are individually made —this 
allows for the possibility of disagreement concerning attributions of 
responsibility. In fact, the practice of offering excuses and exempting 
conditions may be better understood as an argumentative practice: after 
all, excuses and exemptions play the role of justificatory and explanatory 
reasons.4
3. Responsibility as a two-step process
So far, I have argued that while both excuses and exemptions have 
the capacity to modify the degree of responsibility attributed, they aim 
at different stages of the process of attributing responsibility. On the 
one hand, exempting conditions diminish or eliminate the relevance 
of the role of the agent in the explanation of the outcome for which 
responsibility is being attributed. An agent’s obsessive-compulsive 
disorder plays a more relevant role in the explanation of why this 
agent washes her hands every ten minutes than this agent’s reasons 
and beliefs —such as her belief that her hands are full of bacteria. That 
is, she does not display full authorship, for her washing her hands is 
not responsive to her reasons. On the other hand, we offer an excuse to 
show that, even if the outcome is explainable through our authorship, 
our choices are fully or partially (morally) justified by our reasons. 
It may be correct to explain a dog’s death through appealing to the 
treatment that a veterinary surgeon has applied; however, the vet may 
offer different excuses to affect her responsibility. She can adduce that 
the dog was in a terrible condition and that it was morally permissible 
(or even mandatory) to put a painless end to its suffering; in this case, 
she is offering a full justification. Not knowing that the dog was allergic 
to that particular treatment, on the other hand, may fully or partially 
justify her, depending on whether it was reasonable for her to know 
4 This is a standard distinction in the philosophy of action; see, for an 
overview of the kinds of reasons, Álvarez (2009).
243Excuses and exemptions
Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 49 (2015)
about that allergy. Moral responsibility always requires an evaluation 
of the agent’s reasons, and excuses aim to intervene in this evaluation.
The two tasks involved in the process of attributing responsibility 
—explaining and evaluating— are often done simultaneously. Certain 
defences could be considered both an excuse and an exempting condition. 
For instance, duress affects both the explanatory claim and the evaluative 
claim. If I have been threatened to rob a bank, the threat is relevant in 
the explanation of the robbery of the bank, to the point it diminishes the 
explanatory relevance of my reasons for robbing a bank, and hence my 
authorship. Even if it did not make me fully exempt (because, let us say, 
the threat consists in the publication of a compromising photograph of 
mine, so not robbing the bank was still available as an option for me), the 
threat may also justify (again, either fully of partially) my actions, that 
is, robbing the bank.
Now, what are the implications of the proposed distinction for a 
theory of responsibility? While this distinction does not explicitly favour 
a particular theory of responsibility, it does support an account of what 
responsibility attributions consist of. First, as I have argued throughout 
this article, attributions of responsibility involve two distinct kinds of 
judgements: an explanatory one (the outcome happened because of 
the accused), and an evaluative one (what the accused did was morally 
wrong). So, what kind of judgements are excuses and allegations of 
exempting conditions themselves? Insofar as exempting conditions 
are adduced to mitigate the explanatory role of the accused, they are 
presented in explanatory judgements as well. Excuses, on the other hand, 
aim to justify the accused, and therefore they are evaluative judgements. 
Against the accusation of having acted wrongly, the accused may try 
to justify her actions, that it, to challenge the wrongness of her actions. 
This suggests that holding someone responsible has an argumentative 
aspect: ultimately, attributing responsibility is way of demanding 
answerability from the accused. In fact, it is reasonable to claim that 
blame has always to be open to refutal, for the accuser might be wrong. 
So, the distinction presented here supports a dialogical and social view 
of responsibility. Hence, the distinction is not meant to explain the 
difference between being excused and being exempt, or between being 
appropriately excused or exempt. It is a distinction between two ways of 
responding to responsibility attributions. The problem of the relation 
between being responsible and being held responsible (Smith, 2007) 
remains open. In order to know what being excused (or exempt) or 
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being appropriately excused (or exempt) amount to, we would have to 
tackle the issue of what being morally wrong (or explanatorily relevant) 
(simpliciter) amounts to.
Second, this distinction between excuses and exemptions, that 
is, between the evaluative and the explanatory judgements involved 
in responsibility attributions, supports a two-staged model of 
responsibility attributions, first proposed by Ross, who suggests the 
following metaphor of responsibility as a trial:
The connection of responsibility with a trial shows that 
to be responsible for something can mean basically two 
different things corresponding to the two steps in the 
trial: accusation and judgement. In the first place being 
the person who can, when the situation demands, be 
rightfully accused (required to answer, give account); 
secondly, being someone who also satisfies the 
conditions of guilt and can therefore be rightfully 
sentenced (Ross, 1975, 17).
To rightfully accuse someone, then, consists in finding out whether 
there is an agential relation to the outcome, and whether the agent is 
exempt. I have labelled this kind of responsibility agential. On the 
other hand, to rightfully judge someone involves an evaluation of the 
conditions of guilt; if those conditions apply, the agent is judged to have 
acted wrongly. Given certain circumstances, the agent might be fully 
justified and therefore agent-responsible, but not accountable. Excuses 
may also partially justify the agent: she may be accountable, but her 
moral responsibility may be diminished.
Third, it is important to note that, in the analysis presented, excuses 
and exemptions do not aim to affect blame, that is, the practice of social 
and public punishment of the accused, either in the form of expressions 
of resentment, condemnation or any other act, directed to the accused, 
made in response to her actions.5 Of course, it is possible to adduce 
certain conditions that aim to affect the response to some morally wrong 
action. In fact, apologies aim to diminish blame: they do not justify 
the accused, but acknowledge that she has acted wrong, and that she 
5 Of course, if one maintains that blame consists precisely in the negative 
moral evaluation of the agent, then excuses do aim to affect it. I am now 
concerned with the social practice of blame or praise.
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already experiences a negative feeling about the impact of her actions 
(if the apology is sincere). Apologies, though, are not the only way of 
mitigating blame. Suppose that Bob finds out now that Ann lost a book 
he had lent her a long time ago. Even if he finds Ann’s action (of losing 
the book and not telling him) morally faulty, it may not make sense 
to blame her for it now. On the contrary, other circumstances make it 
appropriate to blame the agent: if she has acted wrongly many times, 
she may receive a greater punishment than if she were acting for the first 
time. Excuses and exemptions may affect blame, but they do not show 
whether the agent deserves blame or praise.
4. Experimental and normative accounts of responsibility
The argument offered here is analytical: it aims to establish 
conceptual connections between attributing responsibility, offering 
excuses, and alleging exempting conditions. Those phenomena, though, 
have received increasing attention from an empirical perspective, 
specially within the fields of experimental philosophy (see Knobe et al., 
2012 for an overview) and moral psychology (see Ditto et al., 2009). In 
this last section, I will discuss some of the empirical findings concerning 
the relation between causation and moral responsibility.
Before considering the main hypotheses tested by recent works on 
moral responsibility and causal judgements, I will briefly introduce 
some relevant differences between empirical research and conceptual 
analysis. Since the emergence of experimental philosophy, there is 
an ongoing intense meta-philosophical debate concerning the role of 
intuitions —particularly, the intuitions of analytic philosophers— in the 
explanation of human nature. Experimental philosophers claim that 
many philosophical questions can and should be addressed through 
empirical methods. Other philosophers, on the contrary, defend 
intuitions as a legitimate justification of philosophical claims (Kauppinen, 
2007). Although I sympathise with this latter view, providing a defense 
would exceed the scope of this paper. But since this section examines the 
framework presented above in the light of some experimental results on 
attributions of responsibility, I need first to address the issue of how, in 
my view, empirical results and conceptual analysis relate to each other.
Analytical arguments, such as the one carried throughout this 
article, aim at conceptual refinement, at the establishment of explanatory 
hypotheses that may or may not be suitable for empirical testing, and 
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at the explicit statement of philosophical intuitions, amongst other 
things. Experimental methods serve to test hypotheses, and to isolate 
new phenomena, amongst other purposes. Experimental philosophy 
has the goal of testing philosophers’ intuitions —those that are used 
to support an argument, to provide counterexamples, to suggest 
thought experiments (Knobe and Nichols, 2013). In this context, 
testing philosophers’ intuitions amounts to checking whether those 
intuitions are pervasive amongst other social groups. However, while 
I acknowledge the scientific relevance of enhancing our knowledge of 
people’s moral intuitions, I also find philosophically and scientifically 
valuable to suggest new conceptual frameworks and to construct new 
normative models for understanding human nature.
Many, if not most facets of human nature are normative: examples 
of normative phenomena are language and argumentation, reasoning 
and knowledge, moral actions, legal institutions, social agreements and 
collective actions. To say that they are normative is to say that there are 
correct and incorrect acts within those spheres. We may argue cogently 
or fallaciously, or we may incorrectly believe that the Earth is flat. We 
may speak German poorly or proficiently, and we may be great or 
terrible football players. We break promises, and we are (sometimes) 
akratic. In order to know whether we ourselves, or others, are doing 
something wrong, we appeal to normative standards. Those standards 
aren’t fixed: there are historical, cultural and even subjective differences 
between standards. I will leave aside the question of whether those 
normative standards are normative facts, objectively knowable. For the 
sake of the argument, it suffices to acknowledge that those standards 
exist—otherwise, it would not be possible to judge that some certain act 
is incorrect.
The conceptual framework I have argued for in this paper includes 
normative standards. On the one hand, I have argued that causal 
explanations are required and offered in a context, which determines 
why we attribute relevance to certain things and not to others. Normative 
standards of all kinds are part of those background assumptions. On the 
other hand, evaluative judgements are also made within a context that 
gives saliency to some events, facts and properties. Moral evaluations are 
specially, although not exclusively, made against moral standards. The 
framework here presented is itself a normative model of responsibility: 
it could, in principle, be used as a normative standard for attributing 
responsibility.
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This is so because normative models are prescriptive: they tell us 
how we should act, and serve to evaluate whether an act is correct or 
incorrect according to the standard. Descriptive models, on the other 
hand, aim at accurate representation. For example, normative models 
of rational choice prescribe how to decide —one should choose the 
option that maximises her utility. Descriptive models of rational choice 
examine the actual process of choice —very often, they greatly diverge 
from what is prescribed by normative models (Baron, 2004). The 
methodological problem lies then in how empirical findings ought to 
affect normative models: should they be abandoned, or modified, in the 
light of mismatching evidence? I will turn again to this point later.
I will now examine some of the evidence gathered by experimental 
philosophers and moral psychologists concerning the relation between 
causal and moral judgements, and I will argue that the evidence is 
compatible with a two-staged normative model of responsibility.
Evidence from a variety of experimental settings support the claim 
that normative considerations play a role in people’s assessment of 
causal factors. Those experiments involve two or more similar narratives, 
which only differ in a certain normative aspect of the story: events and 
characters vary in their typicality, their moral status, their social role, or 
the desirability of their motives. Alicke (1992) pioneered the empirical 
study of how moral considerations influence causal judgements; he 
introduced the participants two scenarios:
John was driving over the speed limit (about 40 mph in 
a 30 mph zone) in order to get home in time to...
Socially desirable motive
...hide an anniversary present for his parents that he 
had left out in the open before they could see it.
Socially undesirable motive
...hide a vial of cocaine he had left out in the open before 
his parents could see it.
Other cause
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Oil spill. As John came to an intersection, he applied 
his brakes, but was unable to stop as quickly as usual 
because of some oil that had spilled on the road. As a 
result, John hit a car that was coming from the other 
direction.
Tree branch. As John came to an intersection, he failed to 
see a stop sign that was covered by a large tree branch. 
As a result, John hit a car that was coming in the other 
direction.
Other car. As John came to an intersection, he applied his 
brakes, but was unable to avoid a car that ran through 
a stop sign without making any attempt to slow down. 
As a result, John hit the car that was coming from the 
other direction.
Consequence of accident
John hit the driver on the driver’s side, causing him 
multiple lacerations, a broken collarbone, and a 
fractured arm. John was uninjured in the accident.
Complete the following sentence: The primary cause of 
this accident was ___ (Alicke, 1992, 369).
Participants, Alicke found out, were more prone to identify John as 
the primary cause of the accident in the case in which he was motivated 
by a socially undesirable motive than when his desire was socially 
desirable. Alicke concludes that “with causal necessity, sufficiency, and 
proximity held constant, the more culpable act was deemed by subjects 
to have exerted a larger causal influence” (1992, 370).
A similar experiment was conducted by Knobe and Fraser (2008). 
They presented the participants the following vignette:
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her 
desk stocked with pens. The administrative assistants 
are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are 
supposed to buy their own.
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The administrative assistants typically do take the 
pens. Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The 
receptionist has repeatedly emailed them reminders 
that only administrative assistants are allowed to take 
the pens.
On Monday morning, one of the administrative 
assistants encounters Professor Smith walking past the 
receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the 
receptionist needs to take an important message... but 
she has a problem. There are no pens left on her desk 
(Knobe and Fraser, 2008, 443).
The subjects participating in the experiment were asked to state their 
degree of agreement with each of these propositions: “Professor Smith 
caused the problem” and “The administrative assistant caused the 
problem”. Participants were prone to agree with the claim that Professor 
Smith caused the problem, while disagreed with the statement that the 
assistant caused the problem. However, Knobe and Fraser argue, both 
behaviours are equally frequent; the only difference stems from the 
different moral value of each action. Therefore, they conclude, moral 
judgements affect the process by which we make causal claims.
Knobe and Fraser’s conclusion has been revised by Roxborough and 
Cumby (2009), who argue that the experiment lacks from a differentiation 
of a crucial factor to attribute a role in a causal explanation: the typicality 
(or atypicality) of events. The authors conducted another experiment, 
with the same scenario, but introducing a variation on how typical the 
rule-following and the rule-violation behaviour was. They conclude 
that the typicality or atypicality of a behaviour affect causal judgements. 
Furthermore, a variation in the typicality of the competing causes (in 
this example, the administrative staff behaviour) affects attributions 
of causal relevance to Professor Smith, even when the typicality of his 
behaviour remains constant.
Driver (2008) argues that the evidence obtained so far is compatible 
with a broader interpretation of the relation between causal and moral 
judgements:
When we make attributions of primary causation, that 
is, when we pick out the cause of an event among a 
nest of causal factors, it is quite true that we often rely 
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on pragmatic and contextual considerations […] The 
identification in judgment of something’s being the 
cause depends upon pragmatic factors and may well 
include moral judgments […] What we call a “cause” 
or “causal factor” in many cases depends on what we 
relegate to the background conditions of the event in 
question (Driver, 2008, 425).
Driver’s claim, thus, is that normative considerations play a 
role in attributing causal relevance. The conceptual framework also 
acknowledges that this is so. As it has been suggested in the previous 
section, we may express an evaluative judgement and a causal judgement 
simultaneously —in fact, certain mitigating conditions, such as duress, 
are both excuses and exempting conditions. One and the same reason 
(that you acted under duress) is a reason for judging that other things 
had more explanatory saliency and a reason for changing our mind 
about the moral status of your actions and of yourself. Hence, a two-
staged model of responsibility is compatible with the results obtained in 
the experiments discussed above. Now, is this all we can conclude?
The answer to this question depends on how we tackle the 
methodological and epistemic problem of the empirical (dis)confirmation 
of normative models, as well as on whether the framework presented 
above has an empirical interpretation, one that could be (dis)confirmed 
by the evidence. I will first address this second question.
The experiments above show that normative evaluations and 
causal explanations are two interrelated kinds of judgements, both 
of them relevant for attributing responsibility. In this paper, I have 
provided a different argument for the same conclusion. I have argued 
that mitigating conditions can be divided in two categories: excuses 
and exempting conditions. This distinction is based in the following 
intuition. Attributions of moral responsibility express an accusation: 
“What you did was wrong”. To respond to the accusation, you may 
adduce that what you did is not wrong, or that it is less wrong than 
it initially appears to the accuser —you then offer an excuse. On the 
other hand, you may point out that you did not do what you are being 
accused of, or that there is more in the story of the causal production of 
the outcome that makes your intervention less relevant than it initially 
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appears to the accuser —you then offer an exempting condition.6 So, 
the question is: if we take this distinction to be an empirical claim, do 
the experiments presented above (dis)confirm it? I doubt so. At best, as 
pointed out earlier, the evidence is compatible with this distinction.
An empirical research, though, may be performed in order to test 
people’s intuitions about how different mitigating conditions work, and 
how they affect the evaluative and the causal judgements separately. It 
would be necessary to adapt the framework presented, and reformulate 
it so the main and auxiliary hypothesis are clearly stated. Without 
doubt, it would be scientifically and philosophically valuable to have 
a better knowledge of the actual practice of offering excuses and other 
mitigating conditions.7 After all, attributing responsibility is often a social 
phenomenon: to attribute responsibility is to make people answerable, 
to make them respond to their own actions. Hence, in order to go one 
step beyond compatibility, the framework should be reformulated 
so the hypothesis are clearly stated; they could then be confirmed, or 
disconfirmed by the evidence.
Finally, the problem of the (dis)confirmation of a normative account 
of responsibility attributions through empirical evidence remains 
open. Solving it will require a deeper understanding of the epistemic 
properties of normative models. As a first approximation, we might 
say that if a model is impracticable, that is, it cannot be implemented 
in the actual object that is represented in the model, then there is good 
reason to reformulate or to abandon the model. Imagine a normative 
building evacuation model, which depicts how people ought to 
abandon a building in the case of an emergency. This models are used 
in the design of the building. Now, a building evacuation model whose 
instructions cannot be followed (for example: it assumes that people 
walk faster than they can) is a failed model and should be abandoned. 
In other cases, people tend to act contrary to what is prescribed in the 
model —think of the frequency of ad hominem claims. People are able 
6 A third kind of response that I have mentioned, but that I have not 
developed here, is the one that aims to mitigate the acts of blame (or praise): you 
acknowledge full responsibility, and apologise, for instance.
7 The practice of justifying one’s actions has in fact been long studied by 
social psychologists; see, for example, Weiner (1995). Of course, an empirical 
study of the excuses/exemptions distinction should take into account this 
previous experimental work.
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to follow the model; they simply do not do it. Should the standard 
argumentative model be abandoned in the light of the pervasiveness 
of fallacious claims? The answer is negative: we have good reasons to 
keep those models, reasons that are independent from the frequency of 
deviating behaviour. For example, there are good reasons to maintain 
a truth-preserving argumentation model: if the premises are true, so is 
the conclusion. Those independent reasons have to do with the fact that 
one of the main goals of argumentation is to gain knowledge: we aim 
to know what to do, to know how things stand. The fact that truth is 
the aim of knowledge is a reason to create truth-preserving models of 
reasoning and argumentation, and this is a reason that is independent 
from the typicality of the deviation.
Similarly, there are good reasons to defend a normative model 
of responsibility attributions, reasons that are independent from the 
frequency with which people devate from the model —an example of 
deviation from this model, for instance, would be to make someone 
responsible while acknowledging that she had no causal influence on 
the outcome. Those independent reasons have to do with one of the 
main aims of attributing responsibility: the pursuit of fairness. It is 
unfair to attribute agential or moral responsibility for an outcome to 
someone who played no role in the causal production of the outcome, in 
the same sense that it would be unfair to attribute moral responsibility 
for a morally neutral outcome to someone who has not acted immorally. 
This is, I think, the main motivation to accept the normative framework 
presented in this paper.
Concluding remarks: What about praise?
I hope to have shown that a close examination of the different kinds of 
allegations an agent may present to mitigate her responsibility can shed 
some light on the explanation of the practice of attributing responsibility. 
I have narrowed my analysis to responsibility for wrongdoing, leaving 
praiseworthiness out of the discussion. The judgements involved in 
attributions of praise are the same as those involved in attributions of 
blame, that is, an explanatory and an evaluative judgement.8 Mitigating 
8 However, background assumptions for explaining a morally wrong 
outcome seem to be different from those that are present when explaining a 
morally good one; particularly, the relevance of the agent’s intentions vary, as 
Knobe (2003) has show in a series of long-discussed experiments.
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conditions for praise have received much lesser attention than their 
counterparts for blame. In principle, though, one may also try to affect 
the explanatory or the evaluative judgements involved in an attribution 
of praise.
Consider the following situation: Ann has consumed a large quantity 
of alcohol, and when walking back home, she sees a house set on fire; 
she then runs towards the house, enters it, and a few minuted later, she 
exits the house with a toddler in her hands, whom she has saved from 
the fire. Ann’s actions are usually considered praiseworthy; however, 
we know that Ann would not have entered the house being sober. She 
felt overconfident because of the alcohol she had drunk. In this case, it 
seems reasonable not to attribute responsibility to Ann for rescuing the 
toddler, or at least to attribute only partial responsibility, for Ann having 
consumed alcohol plays an important role in the explanation of the 
outcome, and thus it would play the role of an exempting condition. On 
the other hand, there are cases in which one tries to affect the evaluative 
judgement involved in attributions of praise. Suppose that Ann has 
saved the toddler from the previous example without having consumed 
any alcohol: she just decided to enter the house and look for people in 
distress. When being praised for her action, she reveals that she works 
as a firefighter. Although having saved a life is no doubt a morally good 
action, Ann may argue that it was in fact her duty to enter the house 
and look for survivors. Here, the evaluative judgement is affected, and 
Ann’s responsibility may be diminished. Of course, there is a lot more to 
say about mitigating conditions for morally good outcomes and actions; 
these two examples merely show that, in principle, it is possible to apply 
the distinction developed above to such kind of cases.
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